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Abstract 
 
 
In timing perception studies, the timing of one event is usually manipulated relative 
to another, and participants are asked to judge if the two events were synchronous, 
or to judge which of the two events occurred first. Responses are analyzed to 
determine a measure of central tendency, which is taken as an estimate of the timing 
at which the two events are perceptually synchronous. When these estimates don’t 
coincide with physical synchrony, it is often assumed that the sensory signals are 
asynchronous, as though the transfer of information concerning one input has been 
accelerated or decelerated relative to the other. Here we show that, while this is a 
viable interpretation, it is equally plausible that such effects are driven by shifts in 
the criteria used to differentiate simultaneous from asynchronous inputs. Our 
analyses expose important ambiguities concerning the interpretation of simultaneity 
judgement data, which have hitherto been underappreciated. 
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Introduction 
Our ability to perceive the time at which events occur is an important topic of 
psychological investigation. Indeed, some have ascribed the birth of experimental 
psychology to an event at the Greenwich observatory in 1796, when Maskelyne, the 
astronomer royal, dismissed his assistant Kinnebrook for incompetence regarding the 
timing of transits, supposedly on the basis that the assistant’s estimates differed 
systematically from his own (Mollon & Perkins, 1996). Although Kinnebrook’s dismissal 
may have had more to do with his judgements about marriage than his judgements about 
transits (he had recently refused to accept a match suggested by his employer) the episode 
provoked another astronomer, Bessel, to investigate the so-called “personal equation”: 
the differences in perceptual and reaction times across individuals. Wundt’s school was 
to pursue this question in the latter half of the nineteenth century, and the general topic of 
temporal perception has remained active ever since. 
 
1. Estimating perceived timing 
 The basic assumption underlying all studies of timing perception is that there 
might be a difference between physical and perceived event timings (an assumption that 
follows naturally from the distributed and delayed nature of neural activity). This entire 
field of enquiry is therefore inherently subjective. The two most common tasks used to 
assess perceived timing are simultaneity judgements (SJs, e.g. Fujisaki, Shimojo, 
Kashino & Nishida, 2004; Moutoussis & Zeki, 1997a; Moutoussis & Zeki, 1997b; Stone 
et al., 2002) and temporal order judgements (TOJs; e.g. Eagleman & Sejnowski, 2000; 
McDonald, Teder-Salejarvi, Di Russo & Hillyard, 2005; Sugita & Suzuki, 2003). In SJs, 
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participants are shown a combination of two, or more, events and are asked whether or 
not they were synchronous. In TOJs, participants are asked to judge which event 
happened first. 
 
In studies involving either TOJs or SJs, it is common to fit noisy data from 
individual participants with a continuous function to derive key parameters, such as a 
measure of central tendency. This is often taken as an estimate of the relative timing at 
which two events seem synchronous – the point of subjective simultaneity (PSS). This 
terminology itself is misleading, as there is seldom, if ever, a precise timing relationship 
at which two events seem synchronous and none other. Instead, there is typically a 
relatively broad range of timings at which events are at least sometimes judged as 
synchronous (see Figure 1 parts A and B). However, this basic approach is almost 
ubiquitous in studies of timing perception, as is the tendency to assign meaning to the 
fitted parameters without fully discussing the assumptions underlying the continuous 
function fits, and the limitations that these place on interpretation. Indeed, we speculate 
that researchers might sometimes forget that by fitting a function and extracting one or 
more parameters, they are implicitly countenancing a model of the underlying 
psychological processes. 
 
In what follows, we will consider some simple models that make use of concepts 
derived from signal detection theory (Green & Swets, 1966). The information-processing 
models we investigate may be considered rather abstract, in that they propose a 
continuous internal representation of stimulus magnitude (an internal response; in our 
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case the time between two sensory events) without giving a detailed account of how this 
representation is generated or maintained in the brain. However, models specified at this 
level of abstraction have informed the curve fittings used in timing tasks (and indeed 
many other psychophysical judgements). A key feature of these models is that they 
distinguish between the information available, based on the internal response, and the 
interpretation of this information, based on the setting of one or more decision criteria. 
This is a distinction we will pursue here. Although we will sometimes allude to 
underlying neural processes in the course of developing our argument, we consider the 
precise neural instantiation of these models to be beyond the scope of this paper. 
 
2. Assumptions underlying analyses of TOJs 
 We begin by considering the temporal order judgement. Here, two stimuli, A and 
B, are presented at a range of stimulus offset asynchronies (SOAs; B-A) and the observer 
judges their order. The proportion of times that stimulus B is judged to come second is 
usually an increasing function of SOA (see Figure 1 part A). A straightforward model of 
this task assumes that each stimulus is accompanied by Gaussian noise affecting its 
central arrival latency, and that the two stimuli might be delayed by neural processing to 
different extents (Baron, 1969; Gibbon & Rutschmann, 1969). It is further assumed that 
these noisy and delayed arrival times produce a distribution of differences in central 
arrival time for any physical SOA, which is also Gaussian. This central arrival time can 
therefore be thought of as a kind of subjective SOA. Accordingly, the difference detected 
on any given trial must be compared to a criterion (zero for an unbiased observer) in 
order to reach a judgement. If the difference falls below the criterion, B is judged to have 
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come first. If it falls above the criterion, B is judged to come second. This model, 
schematised in Figure 2 part A, predicts a cumulative Gaussian psychometric function, 
which closely approximates the data observed in most timing studies. 
 
Above, we have described perhaps the most basic model of the TOJ. There are a 
range of other TOJ models with similar basic assumptions, but more complex decision 
mechanisms. Each predicts a similar shaped function (Sternberg & Knoll, 1973). The 
slope of the function is taken to reflect both sensory noise and decision/criterion noise. 
The midpoint of the function is assumed to reflect any relative processing delay between 
the two stimuli (hereafter referred to as a differential delay, a value which can be added 
to the objective SOA to yield a subjective SOA, as depicted in Figure 1) in addition to the 
placement of the criterion. 
 
This last point is important. The PSS derived in this way from TOJ data cannot 
unambiguously indicate a differential delay for two stimuli, which is what we usually 
wish to infer, because a criterion shift is an equally plausible explanation of a shift in the 
measure of central tendency. For example, a PSS of -20 ms might reflect a differential 
delay of +10 ms and a criterion set at -30 ms, or any other combination summing to -20. 
It may seem strange that a criterion for judging arrival times should ever deviate from 
zero. Unfortunately, participants in psychophysical experiments seem rather prone to 
shifting their criteria based on incidental features of the question being asked (e.g Bedell, 
Chung, Ogmen & Patel, 2003; Clifford, Arnold & Pearson, 2003), and it has proven 
rather difficult to completely eliminate these biases (Shore, Spence & Klein, 2001; 
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Spence, Shore & Klein, 2001). This is one reason that some investigators have suggested, 
albeit tentatively, that simultaneity judgements might make a better choice of task than 
temporal order judgements when the PSS is an important parameter for investigation 
(Schneider & Bavelier, 2003; van Eijk, Kohlrausch, Juola & van de Par, 2008; Zampini, 
Shore & Spence, 2005). 
 
3. Assumptions underlying analyses of SJs 
Simultaneity judgements are similar to TOJs, except that participants judge 
whether two stimuli presented on each trial are presented at the same or at different times. 
This leads to a function which rises as the SOA approaches zero, then falls off again (see 
Figure 1 part B). At first sight, the criterion used in SJs (i.e. a decision about when two 
events are close enough together to be judged synchronous) may appear less problematic 
than the one used for TOJs, because it seems to affect the height of the curve rather than 
any measure of central tendency. Interestingly, while the function commonly used to fit 
TOJs has a clear modelling rationale, the function most commonly used to fit SJs (the 
Gaussian or truncated Gaussian; e.g. Fujisaki et al., 2004; Stone et al., 2002) is rarely 
discussed, and seems to have been chosen primarily for convenience. This makes it rather 
difficult to spell out what the PSS derived from this function (usually taken as the peak of 
the fitted Gaussian) might represent.  
 
To elucidate the often unstated assumptions underlying analyses of simultaneity 
data, we can take as a starting point the derivation provided by Schneider and Bavelier 
(2003). This derivation builds on work by Sternberg and Knoll (1973), Allan (1975) and 
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Ulrich (1987). A slight variant has also recently been used to fit SJ data by Cravo, 
Claessens and Baldo (2011). The model is as described above for the TOJ task, except 
that the observer is assumed to use two criteria rather than one. If the difference in central 
arrival times falls between these two criteria, the observer calls the stimuli simultaneous.  
This leads to a simultaneity function defined as the difference of two cumulative 
Gaussians. The model is schematised in Figure 2 part B. 
 
Leaving aside for the moment estimates of noise, the TOJ model we described 
earlier provides one parameter (the PSS) which reflects two degenerate variables (the 
differential delay and the placement of the criterion) while the SJ model provides two 
parameters (the midpoints of the two cumulative Gaussians) which reflect three 
degenerate variables (the differential delay and the extents of two criteria). To clarify the 
terminology we will use when referring to our SJ models and data: The boundaries are 
points along the objective timeline of SOAs, such that when the signals plus sensory 
noise fall between these two values the observer judges them as simultaneous. The 
criteria are decision boundaries applied to the subjective timeline of SOAs (depicted as 
dashed lines in Figures 2 part B). The extents of the two criteria are the distances of each 
one from a subjective time zero, which may differ from objective time zero due to 
differential neural delays. Hence, if two cumulative Gaussians imply boundaries at -100 
and +100 ms, for example, this could reflect a differential delay of +10 ms with a low 
criterion extent of 110 ms and a high criterion extent of 90 ms, or any other combination 
of values that add up correctly. This point bears reiteration: A fitted model of this kind 
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tells us about boundaries, but the differential delay is free to trade off against the extent 
of the two criteria within these boundaries. 
 
Hence for SJs, as for TOJs, it is only possible to estimate all of the underlying 
variables by making further assumptions. For example, in the more straightforward of 
their derivations, Schneider and Bavelier (2003) adopted the triggered-moment model 
(Venables, 1960). This model suggests that the first stimulus to arrive centrally triggers a 
time-consuming mental process, and that judgements of simultaneity occur when the 
second stimulus arrives while this process is being conducted. As arrival order does not 
matter in this account, the two criteria must be set at equal temporal distances relative to 
the coincidence of central arrival times (i.e. subjective time zero). If stimuli arrive 
centrally in the order AB, the observer says simultaneous if B-A < X ms, whereas if they 
arrive in the order BA, they say simultaneous when A-B < X ms. Under this model a PSS 
can therefore be derived which reflects only the differential delay, alongside a single 
criterion extent (X, which applies equally to both sides of the difference distribution). 
This PSS falls at the mid-point of the difference of cumulative Gaussians, so it would be 
similar to the PSS commonly obtained when a single Gaussian function is used to fit SJ 
data, but this model has the additional advantage of being able to capture a flattened peak 
due to a broad range of values being perceived as simultaneous. 
 
One point we wish to make forcefully is that we do not think that the added 
assumption of the triggered moment model (i.e. equality in criterion extents) is 
particularly compelling. We will appeal to some established properties of the neural 
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response to illustrate this point, although we recognise that the models we are describing 
are not fully specified at this level of analysis. Consider first that two events that are 
physically transient will give rise to internal neural activity that is persistent. Indeed, 
psychophysical findings suggest that sensory inputs undergo a form of low-pass filtering 
as they are processed in the brain (de Lange, 1958; Roufs & Blommaert, 1981; 
Viemeister, 1979; Weisenberger, 1986). Taking the example of an audiovisual pair, it is 
likely that the internal response to a visual stimulus is prolonged relative to the internal 
response to an auditory stimulus (de Lange, 1958; Viemeister, 1979). 
 
This notion is illustrated in Figure 3. We envisage that a temporal comparison 
between the two stimuli is achieved based upon the difference in their detection times, 
with detection being based on the rising portion of the impulse response. The difference 
in detection times gives us the subjective SOA. However, it does not tell us how a 
criterion is selected to determine whether the stimulus that is detected second is 
synchronous with the stimulus that is detected first. Given the situation depicted in Figure 
3, it seems quite reasonable that a more liberal criterion extent would be adopted when 
judging whether an auditory event which just followed a visual stimulus was 
simultaneous with it, compared to the reverse situation. We might think of this as 
something akin to applying the rule: “If the second stimulus arrives while I can still 
perceive the first stimulus, they are simultaneous”. This would imply independent criteria 
for the two orders of stimulus presentation, because lights persist longer than sounds. 
Furthermore, it seems quite reasonable that a particular experimental context or 
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instruction could give rise to a shift in one criterion that is not automatically mirrored by 
a shift in the other. 
 
If independent criteria are in place, one must be careful when interpreting the PSS 
from SJ tasks, just as one must be careful in interpreting the PSS from TOJs. We can only 
say where two boundaries are positioned relative to the objective SOA axis, and that the 
differential delay should fall between these boundaries. These issues are illustrated in 
Figures 4 & 5, which show the psychophysical functions that are predicted to arise under 
the two-criterion SJ model when criteria and differential delays are varied. The main 
point to note from Figure 4 is that an identical change between the data observed in two 
experimental conditions can, in principal, arise from either a change in differential delay 
or from a change in the placement of criteria. However, Occam’s razor can be used to 
provide some support for one interpretation over the other. The main point to note from 
Figure 5 is that even when employing the law of parsimony to aid interpretation, the 
difference between data that would favour a change in the differential delay and data that 
would favour a shift in a criterion is likely to be rather subtle. 
 
The critical issue at hand, then, is whether data which are consistent with 
subjective timing shifts can be taken as unequivocal evidence for a shift in the relative 
time course of neural responses for two or more inputs. Certainly it is possible that a PSS 
shift, as indicated by a measure of central tendency in a continuous function fitted to TOJ 
or SJ data, reflects an altered time course of neural activity. However, we will argue that 
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it is at least equally plausible that the time courses of neural activity remain unchanged, 
but that criteria concerning temporal judgments are altered.  
 
In what follows we present two analyses of temporal judgement data. We take as 
a starting point the model outlined above and use it to evaluate the possibility of a neural 
timing shift in different experimental conditions. In the first analysis we adapt an 
approach introduced by Allan (1975) and developed by Ulrich (1987) to suggest that the 
SJ model requires additional noise in the criteria to better capture the data. Note that this 
analysis does not relate to the question of how a shift in central tendency should be 
interpreted, but rather helps us to determine the simplest model that will adequately 
capture our data. In the second analysis we apply the resultant extended model, 
incorporating criterion noise, to our interpretative question, and find that criterion shifts 
provide as good, or an even better, account of the observed data relative to an assumed 
shift in neural timing.  
 
4. Our SJ dataset – Temporal Recalibration 
The dataset we have chosen for analysis concerns a phenomenon known as 
temporal recalibration (Fujisaki et al., 2004; Vroomen, Keetels, de Gelder & Bertelson, 
2004). We will discuss this phenomenon in more detail soon, but wish to point out from 
the outset that the issues at hand are not specific to this one timing phenomenon. Rather, 
they are common across every instance wherein experimenters have inferred a shift in 
neural processing times on the basis of an apparent PSS shift in different experimental 
conditions (e.g. colour-motion asynchrony, Moutoussis & Zeki, 1997a; audio-visual 
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synchrony with viewing distance, Sugita & Suzuki, 2003; prior entry, Schneider & 
Bavelier, 2003). However, note that we are not claiming that the particular interpretation 
we reach here (regarding the relative contribution of differential delays and the placement 
of criteria) will generalise to all, or indeed to any, of these other cases. Rather, we are 
simply pointing out that similar interpretative ambiguities arise in any SJ data set. This 
fact seems to have been acknowledged by many authors for TOJs (e.g. Shore et al., 2001) 
but perhaps not for SJs (e.g. van Eijk et al., 2008). 
 
In temporal recalibration experiments (Fujisaki et al., 2004; Vroomen et al., 
2004), participants are exposed to long sequences of paired adapting events, consisting 
for example of beeps and flashes. They are then given intermittent test trials to establish 
the point at which two subsequent events seem simultaneous (the point of subjective 
simultaneity or PSS). When beeps lag flashes during adaptation, the PSS tends to shift in 
the same direction, so that a beep lagging a flash is now judged as more simultaneous. A 
reverse effect can ensue following adaptation to a stimulus wherein beeps lead flashes.  
 
Temporal recalibration has been assessed with a variety of tasks, including simple 
reaction times (Di Luca, Machulla & Ernst, 2009; Harrar & Harris, 2008; Navarra, 
Hartcher-O'Brien, Piazza & Spence, 2009) and the perception of ambiguous visual 
stimuli in bimodal displays (Fujisaki et al., 2004). However, it is typically measured as a 
shift in the PSS derived from TOJs or SJs between conditions with different adapting 
asynchronies. Our primary concern here is that temporal recalibration is a good example 
 14
of a phenomenon wherein a PSS shift across experimental conditions has been taken as 
evidence for altered neural processing times. 
 
Methods 
 
Participants 
 We tested 19 participants (five male, mean age = 21.8, SD = 2.5) who took part in 
the experiment for a monetary reward. One participant had to be rejected because no 
reliable fit could be obtained in one or more conditions (see data analysis, below). This 
yielded a sample size of 18 (five male, mean age = 21.8, SD = 2.5). The study was 
approved by the City University London psychology department’s research ethics 
committee. 
 
Apparatus & Stimuli 
 The experiment was controlled by a PC sending digitised signals at 44100 Hz 
using a 12 bit A/D card (National Instruments DAQCard 6715). We confirmed the 
correct timing of output signals using a 20 MHz storage oscilloscope (Gould DSO 1604). 
Participants sat at a comfortable distance (~50 cm) from a computer monitor. A small 
speaker and a red light-emitting diode (LED) mounted in a vertical backing were 
positioned centrally and just in front of the monitor. Visual stimuli were 10 ms LED 
flashes (or 100 ms in the case of infrequent oddball stimuli presented during adaptation). 
Auditory stimuli were 10 ms 1000 Hz pure tones (or 100 ms in the case of oddball 
stimuli). 
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Procedure 
 Each block of trials began with an adaptation phase containing 200 (~1 Hz) 
presentations of audio-visual adaptation stimuli. In separate blocks (with a fixed order) 
adapting tones and flashes were either presented in physical synchrony (0 ms adaptors), 
with tones preceding flashes by 150ms (-150 ms adaptors), or with flashes preceding 
tones by 150ms (+150 ms adaptors). Also in separate blocks (with a counterbalanced 
order) adaptation stimuli were either presented at fixed times after the participant had 
pressed a mouse button, at variable times after the participant had pressed a mouse 
button, or while the participant passively viewed the display. Because this manipulation 
yielded no reliable main effects or interactions in a preliminary analysis, data from these 
latter conditions were pooled in order to improve the reliability of model fits. Each 
category of block was presented twice in succession, yielding a total of eighteen blocks 
of trials for each participant. 
 
To ensure that participants attended to adapting stimuli, we included a secondary 
task. Adaptors were 90% standards (10 ms long tone and flash), 5% visual oddballs (10 
ms tone, 100 ms flash) and 5% auditory oddballs (100 ms tone, 10 ms flash). Participants 
were required to say “oddball” whenever a long stimulus was detected, and this response 
was noted by the experimenter along with the adaptation trial (displayed for this purpose 
in the top left corner of the computer screen). 
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 Following adaptation (or top-up, see below), the entire screen turned red for two 
seconds to signal that a test trial was approaching. After a further pseudorandom delay of 
1000-1500 ms, the LED flashed once. An auditory tone was also presented around this 
time, with an SOA of -450 to +450 ms relative to the flash. This SOA was varied from 
trial to trial. It was selected randomly from a condition-specific distribution. Each 
distribution was initially uniform, containing delay values from -210 to +210 ms in 30 ms 
increments, but was updated after each accepted trial according to the generalized Pólya 
urn model (Rosenberger & Grill, 1997) based on judgements made about temporal order 
(see below). Distributions could therefore expand to include delay values from -450 to 
+450 ms. This procedure produces a majority of values close to the point of subjective 
simultaneity. 
 
 After each test stimulus presentation, a response window appeared on the screen 
and participants were invited to first complete an SJ (“did the flash and the beep seem 
like a single event?”) and then a TOJ (“which came first, the beep or the flash?”). A 
cancel trial option was available in case the participant had been distracted, in which case 
the trial was added to the end of the block. Following their judgements, an on-screen 
message told participants to press the mouse button to initiate a top-up phase of 
adaptation. This was identical to the original adaptation phase, except that it contained 
only eight adaptors. Each block terminated after 35 test trials had been logged, generating 
210 trials per adapting asynchrony condition. 
  
Data analysis 
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 Our first analysis was intended to test the sufficiency of the two-criterion SJ 
model outlined in the introduction. As first noted by Allan (1975) and developed by 
Ulrich (1987), the use of a third “simultaneous” category, in addition to the two order 
responses of a classic TOJ, permits the generation of two psychometric functions. One of 
the two psychometric functions is displaced along the SOA axis relative to the other. The 
relationship between these two functions can permit inferences about the judgement 
process – for example, about whether a two-criterion model is plausible. In fact, under 
the two-criterion SJ model, these functions should be identical to the two cumulative 
Gaussians from which a difference of cumulative Gaussian fit to SJ data can be obtained 
(see Schneider & Bavelier, 2003, appendix A.1 for a derivation). 
 
For the current data, the leftmost function was estimated using the probability (P) 
of judging the stimuli as both successive (Su) and in the order sound then light (SL). An 
increasing function was required, and was calculated as 1 – p(SL∩Su). This function 
relates to the boundary between judging that the sound preceded the light and that the two 
stimuli were simultaneous, i.e. the low boundary. The rightmost function was estimated 
as p(LS∩Su). This function relates to the boundary between judging stimuli as 
simultaneous and judging that the light preceded the sound, i.e. the high boundary. The 
two-criterion SJ model implies that these two functions should be cumulative Gaussians 
with identical slopes, but displaced intercepts (Allan, 1975). However, a range of other 
relationships are possible if we relax the model’s assumptions (Ulrich, 1987). We 
therefore fitted these joint probabilities with cumulative Gaussians using the psignifit 
toolbox version 2.5.6 for Matlab (see http://bootstrap-software.org/psignifit/). This 
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implements a maximum-likelihood method, as described by Wichmann and Hill (2001). 
Judgement uncertainty was estimated as the difference between the SOA values that 
yielded probabilities of 0.5 and 0.84. We rejected one participant because the range of 
SOAs tested was insufficient to form a reasonable estimate of both the low and high 
boundaries (the data included only a single trial more extreme than the estimated 
boundary for three out of six estimates). 
  
As outlined in the results section below, this first analysis suggested that we 
should permit noise in the two boundaries/criteria in order to best fit these data. This 
allows for the position of each criterion to shift from trial to trial, rather than remaining 
fixed. Our second analysis therefore expanded our initial two-criterion SJ model to fit a 
function of the form: 
  
(1) P “simultaneous” = Φ(BHigh, ∆t, σHigh) - Φ(BLow, ∆t, σLow) 
 
 Where Φ(BLow, ∆t, σLow) denotes a cumulative Gaussian (identical to the integral 
of a Gaussian distribution from negative infinity to point BLow , the low boundary), with 
parameters ∆t (i.e. the SOA) and σLow. This final parameter represents: 
 
(2) σLow = √(σ
2
∆D + σ
2
BLow) 
 
 Where σ2∆D is the variance of the difference distribution for central arrival times 
of flashes and beeps (i.e. σ2Flash + σ
2
Beep) and σ
2
BLow is the Gaussian trial-to-trial variance 
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in the placement of the low boundary (or equivalently , the low criterion). Note that the 
first part of Equation 1 can be unpacked in identical fashion, replacing references to the 
low boundary with references to the high boundary. 
 
In order to gain maximum benefit from our dual SJ and TOJ questions, we fitted 
simultaneity data using Equation 1, whilst simultaneously fitting the leftmost and 
rightmost functions (based only on TOJs for trials judged successive, as outlined for 
analysis one) to the component cumulative Gaussians of the simultaneity fit (the low 
boundary and high boundary components respectively).  Hence the same two curves had 
to fit both the order data (from successive trials) and the simultaneity data. This approach 
makes full use of a ternary division of responses (sound-first/simultaneous/light-first), 
ensuring that the fit of the model will be made worse when trials judged successive are 
then assigned the wrong order. A maximum-likelihood fit was obtained using the Nelder-
Mead simplex algorithm (Nelder & Mead, 1965; O'Neill, 1971). The fit yielded four 
parameters: The two boundaries (which can be averaged to provide an estimate of 
differential delay under the triggered moment model, or alternatively interpreted as limits 
on the differential delay in our preferred interpretative scheme) and two measures of 
judgement variability, σLow and σHigh. 
 
The two derived measures of judgment variability (σLow and σHigh) reflect three 
sources of noise: Sensory noise associated with the incoming stimuli, and two further 
sources of noise reflecting variability in the placement of the low and high criteria. We 
cannot uniquely estimate all three sources, but we can derive two useful measures from 
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our parameters. First, we can estimate an upper limit on the sensory noise (equal to the 
smaller of σLow and σHigh). Second, we can estimate the difference in trial-to-trial variance 
between high and low criteria (equal to σ2High - σ
2
Low). Here, a positive value indicates that 
participants are more variable in the placement of their criterion when sounds follow 
lights than vice versa. 
 
To complete our second analysis, we recorded the deviance of the model fit for 
each participant and condition, and then performed a second fit in an identical manner, 
but using a simpler model without noisy criteria. Deviance is an appropriate measure of 
goodness of fit for maximum-likelihood fits (Wichmann & Hill, 2001). Because the two 
models are nested, we can predict how much deviance should improve with the addition 
of a single parameter (it should follow a chi-squared distribution with one degree of 
freedom; Wichmann & Hill, 2001). This provided an extra test regarding the 
appropriateness of the more complex model. 
 
 
Results 
 
Analysis One. 
 We recorded both TOJs and SJs, on every test trial. Combining TOJs and SJs 
permits us to measure two functions1 (Allan, 1975; Ulrich, 1987). The leftmost function 
                                                 
1 In fact, three functions can be derived: The leftmost and rightmost functions we describe here, which 
quantify TOJs on trials judged successive, and the classic TOJ function that quantifies TOJs on all trials 
(which would be expected to lie somewhere between the leftmost and rightmost functions). We have not 
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relates to the boundary between judging that the sound preceded the light and judging 
that the two stimuli were simultaneous, while the rightmost function relates to the 
boundary between judging stimuli as simultaneous and judging that the light preceded the 
sound. 
 
Figure 6 parts A-C show examples of these functions for one participant.  The 
two-criterion SJ model suggests that both functions should be cumulative Gaussians of 
identical slope (Allan, 1975). However, this model forms part of a larger class of model 
termed “general threshold models” (Ulrich, 1987, pp. 225) which share the assumption of 
noise in perceptual latencies but make less restrictive assumptions about the shape of 
noise distributions and, in particular, the presence or absence of criterion noise. For 
simplicity, we retained the notion of Gaussian noise and fitted our leftmost and rightmost 
function with cumulative Gaussians. As previously noted, noiseless (i.e. identical from 
trial to trial) criteria imply parallel functions, because sensory noise is present in equal 
measure regardless of the placement of the criterion. However, differential noise in the 
two criteria can give rise to functions with different slopes (Ulrich, 1987). We therefore 
obtained a measure of judgement uncertainty from our fitted functions (proportional to 
the inverse slope) to assess the need to include criterion noise. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
made use of the classic function because many of our participants opted not to guess temporal order on 
trials they judged as simultaneous, instead making a consistent response that rendered the classic TOJ 
function almost identical to one or other of the leftmost and rightmost functions. This means that the classic 
function has little additional capacity to discriminate between different models. TOJ data on trials judged 
simultaneous have therefore essentially been discarded and are not treated in any of our analyses, making 
our data set identical to that obtained from a ternary response (i.e. sound first/simultaneous/light first). 
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 Figure 6 part D shows the mean judgement uncertainty across participants for 
leftmost and rightmost functions at each adaptor asynchrony. The rightmost function 
shows consistently higher judgement uncertainty (i.e. a consistently shallower slope) than 
the leftmost function. These data were subjected to a 2 (function: leftmost versus 
rightmost) x3 (adaptation: -150, 0, +150 ms) repeated-measures ANOVA, which revealed 
a main effect of function (F = 5.3, df = 1, 18, p =.034; leftmost mean = 88ms, rightmost 
mean = 110 ms). There were no other reliable effects, although the interaction 
approached significance (F = 3.1, df = 1.8, 33.0, p = 0.065) suggesting differences may 
have been greater following -150 and +150 ms adaptation. It seems that participants may 
have had difficulty maintaining a consistent strategy for judging when simultaneity gave 
way to successiveness across trials. 
 
Analysis two 
 Because the leftmost and rightmost functions differed reliably in our first analysis, 
we developed the two-criterion SJ model into a two-noisy-criterion SJ model, with the 
addition of separate sources of Gaussian trial-to-trial noise in the placement of the two 
criteria. We fitted this model to each participant’s data for each adaptor asynchrony. We 
also performed an identical fit for the simpler two-criterion SJ model. We then recorded 
the deviance of the fit for the two-noisy-criterion SJ model and compared it with the 
deviance of the fit (to the same data sets) for the simpler two-criterion SJ model. If the 
models have similar predictive power we should expect the decrease in deviance to 
exceed 3.84 only 5% of the time. The mean decrease in deviance was 9.11, 6.69 and 8.49 
for the -150, 0 and 150 ms adaptor asynchronies respectively, with 34/54 individual fits 
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exceeding the critical 5% value. This reinforces our first analysis, suggesting that an extra 
term included to help capture criterion noise was a justified addition to the original 
model. 
 
With this finding in mind, we adopted the two-noisy-criterion model in order to 
assess how performance changed across the three adaptation conditions. Figure 7 parts A-
C shows example data and fits for one participant (the same participant whose data are 
shown in Figure 6). The derived dependent variables of interest are the positions of the 
two boundaries (Figure 7 parts D and E), the upper limit on sensory noise (Figure 7 part 
F), and the difference in criterion variance (Figure 7 part G). 
 
 The low boundary represents the objective SOA at which participants changed 
from sound-first responses to simultaneous responses. Not surprisingly, it is generally 
negative (i.e. at an SOA where sounds preceded lights). It shifted further in a negative 
direction following -150 ms adaptation (where adapting sounds preceded lights) but was 
similar for 0 ms (synchronous adaptation) and +150 ms adaptors (where adapting sounds 
followed lights). A one-way repeated-measures ANOVA showed a significant effect of 
adaptor asynchrony (F = 14.4, df = 1.6, 27.8, p < 0.001), with follow-up tests showing 
significant differences between the -150 ms condition and both the 0 ms (p < 0.001) and 
+150 ms (p < 0.001) conditions. In contrast, the high boundary (where participants 
partitioned simultaneous and flash-first responses) was generally positive, and became 
more positive following +150 ms adaptation, being similar for 0 ms and -150 ms 
adaptors. Again, an ANOVA showed a significant effect of adaptor asynchrony (F = 3.4, 
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df = 1.9, 32.9, p = 0.045), with follow-up tests this time showing significant differences 
between the +150 ms condition and the -150 ms condition conditions (p = 0.012), 
although the difference between the +150 ms condition and the 0 ms condition only 
approached significance (p = 0.099). 
 
We have presented our data in terms of the placement of two boundaries. Under 
this analysis it looks as though the criterion for judging simultaneity was relaxed (i.e. 
shifted to larger absolute SOAs) exclusively on trials where stimuli arrive in the same 
order as that experienced during concurrent adaptation. This is the interpretation we 
favour. A more typical way to plot these data would be to adopt additional assumptions 
(either explicitly, e.g. based on the triggered moment model, or otherwise) and thus 
present a PSS at the midpoint of the two boundaries. A quick calculation tells us that in 
this case the PSS would shift in the direction of the adapting asynchrony, as is commonly 
found in studies of temporal recalibration (PSS = 10, 24 & 33 ms for -150, 0 & +150 ms 
adaptor asynchronies respectively). For completeness, the mean criterion extent (relative 
to the PSS) should also be reported in such an analysis. Here it would grow slightly 
following -150 ms and +150 ms adaptation compared to the 0 ms condition (criterion 
extent = 132, 123 & 129 ms for -150, 0 & +150 ms adaptor asynchronies respectively). 
Hence one interpretation of the data presented in Figure 3 is that adaptation has led to a 
change in differential neural delays, along with the adoption, consciously or otherwise, of 
a looser criterion for simultaneity. Indeed, there are a number of ways in which a change 
in the differential delay alongside shifts in one or both criteria might yield our result. 
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However, the single criterion shift interpretation is more parsimonious, as we will 
develop in our discussion. 
 
 We also looked at sensory and criterion noise. In this study sensory noise would 
not be expected to vary between adaptation conditions, and indeed the obtained values, 
which represent an upper limit on sensory noise, were very similar to one another with no 
reliable difference emerging (Figure 7 part F). Criterion noise could not be estimated 
separately for each criterion, but the difference in criterion variance between high and 
low criteria was available (Figure 7 part G). The generally positive values suggest that 
the high criterion may have been positioned with greater variability from trial to trial than 
the low criterion (i.e. the criterion shifted around more when sounds followed lights than 
vice versa). The difference across conditions approached significance (F = 3.1, df = 1.6, 
27.3, p= 0.069). This trend suggests that the high criterion may have shown greater 
variability relative to the low criterion following adaptation, particularly following 
positive adaptation (when the mean position of the criterion had also moved outwards). 
  
Discussion 
Here we have examined a phenomenon, audio-visual temporal recalibration 
(Fujisaki et al., 2004; Vroomen et al., 2004), wherein adaptation to asynchronous 
audiovisual inputs alters subsequent judgments of audiovisual timing. Our data suggest 
that when people are subjected to audiovisual adaptors with a particular temporal order, 
the criterion that demarcates judgements of simultaneity from judgements of 
successiveness for that same stimulus order is relaxed, shifting outward toward the 
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adapted timing offset. For example, when exposed to light followed by sound, 
participants were more likely to judge light-then-sound pairs as simultaneous, but showed 
no tendency to judge sound-then-light pairs as less simultaneous than before. We also 
noted a tendency for this effect to be greater when adapting to sounds that lagged lights 
than when adapting to lights that lagged sounds. 
 
 
Realignment of modality timelines versus shifts in criteria 
 Our data are consistent with a shift in just one of two timing criteria following 
adaptation to asynchronous audiovisual inputs, specifically the criterion that generates 
judgements when stimuli arrive in the same order as the adaptors. We note that our data 
look rather similar to the group average data presented in one of the two original reports 
of temporal recalibration (Fujisaki et al., 2004). In that paper, and subsequent temporal 
recalibration studies, analyses were restricted to a consideration of the central tendencies 
of apparent audiovisual timing distributions. Here we have conducted more extensive 
analyses, establishing that such data can be accounted for via a model that assumes the 
existence of two timing criteria, of which only one is shifted post adaptation.  
 
Unfortunately, on the basis of our data, it was impossible to unequivocally 
distinguish between a selective shift of just one timing criterion (as schematised in the 
change from Figure 4 part A to Figure 4 part G) and a change in the differential delay 
between vision and audition that is accompanied by a smaller outward shift of both 
criteria (i.e. a true realignment of sensory timelines plus a small symmetric relaxation of 
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timing criteria; Figure 4 part A versus F). This discrimination would only be possible if, 
post adaptation, one of the two boundaries (the transition points between perceived 
synchrony and asynchrony) were to shift past the unadapted position of the other 
boundary. For instance, in our study this could have happened if, post adaptation, the 
timing at which perceived successiveness  (vision-then-audition) gave way to synchrony 
was shifted beyond the pre-adaptation timing at which perceived synchrony had given 
way to audition-then-vision successiveness. Note that this ambiguity in interpretation for 
SJ data is a central message that we wish to convey in this paper. 
 
 We prefer to interpret our results as showing that the adaptation-dependent shifts 
we measured were confined largely to one of the two criteria, rather than encompassing a 
differential delay, for the following reasons. First, this account is more parsimonious: An 
equivalent account, encompassing a realignment of neural signals, would require that the 
realignment be accompanied by a symmetric relaxation of timing criteria (see Figure 4). 
Second, as outlined in Figure 3, the temporally-smeared neural representations of 
transient sensory events dictate that criterion shifts are plausible. Third, criterion shifts 
along a low-pass filtered neural response imply a fairly tight limit on recalibration 
magnitude, as the criterion cannot reasonably be placed outside the boundaries of the 
neural response. This is consistent with the fact that temporal recalibration has never been 
found to approach the magnitude of the adapting asynchrony, but is rather much smaller. 
Fourth, temporal recalibration is almost invariably tested in a blocked design, which is 
likely to give scope for criterion shifts. Finally, seemingly high-level factors, such as the 
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allocation of attention, can affect recalibration magnitude (Heron, Roach, Whitaker & 
Hanson, 2010).  
 
 Of course, none of the arguments described above are decisive. Against them 
must be weighed the following consideration at least: Recalibration can be observed 
using tasks other than simultaneity judgements, including temporal order judgements, 
simple reaction times, and the stream-bounce illusion (e.g. Di Luca et al., 2009; Fujisaki 
et al., 2004; Hanson, Heron & Whitaker, 2008; Harrar & Harris, 2008; Navarra et al., 
2009). However, all of these tasks also involve criterion settings, even the apparently 
implicit judgements in the multimodal bounce-stream illusion (Grove et al., 2009). 
 
One should also keep in mind that the interpretations we have discussed are only 
valid in the context of the model we have been considering (which is examined in more 
detail below). However, we consider this an improvement over drawing conclusions 
without any model at all. It is likely that by making the model more complex, we could 
have given it a greater capacity to explain the data via either differential delays or 
criterion shifts. For example, we have considered only a simple additive transformation 
between objective SOAs and subjective SOAs in order to model a differential delay. If 
we permitted a non-linearity in this transformation (e.g. a gain below 1.0 applied only to 
SOAs on the adapted side, so that they seem subjectively decreased in magnitude), it 
might provide an alternative account of the recalibration we observed without recourse to 
changes in the criterion2. However, we would first want to demonstrate that such an 
                                                 
2 We thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion. 
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increase in model complexity was justified by some feature of the experimental data or 
physiology. 
 
A final interpretative issue arises because of the specific task we have used in this 
study. We used a combination of a SJ and a TOJ, one after the other, which we have 
effectively transformed into a ternary judgement for analysis (by ignoring TOJ data on 
trials judged simultaneous). It is possible that when participants must keep two questions 
in mind, they behave in a different way to when they must judge only one thing (see 
Alan, 1975, for a direct comparison). Hence it might be interesting to apply our analysis 
to a data set where only SJs were made, to check whether the same pattern emerges (we 
suspect that it would). Many of our participants seemed to translate the two tasks into a 
single ternary judgement (evidenced by a very consistent order judgement on trials 
judged simultaneous), but some participants did attempt to indicate order within the 
simultaneity zone. We note that the model we use here would have no problem dealing 
with above-chance performance in the simultaneity zone (because different criteria may 
be used for SJs versus TOJs). Such data would only be paradoxical under a more 
constrained model in which the SJ criteria are taken to reflect some kind of hard 
limitation, such as the time spent processing the first signal (Alan, 1975). 
 
Two noisy criteria for judging simultaneity 
 Our modelling began with a version of the general independent channels model 
(Sternberg & Knoll, 1973) employing a deterministic decision rule (Baron, 1969; Gibbon 
& Rutschmann, 1969) based on the placement of two criteria for judging simultaneity and 
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temporal order (Allan, 1975). Our first analysis found this model to be wanting. The 
slope of the leftwards and rightwards psychometric functions differed, implying a 
simultaneity function that is steeper on one side than on the other. This is in line with data 
from earlier studies (summarised in Ulrich, 1987) and with more recent research (van 
Eijk et al., 2008). We therefore turned to a less constrained version of the independent 
channels model, the general threshold model (Ulrich, 1987) and selected a variant which 
retained Gaussian sensory noise but also permitted Gaussian noise in the trial-by-trial 
placement of criteria. Our fits suggested that this model did a better job of capturing our 
data. 
 We have commented at length on the issues that arise when attempting to infer a 
differential delay based on SJ data, noting in particular that the SJ faces some of the same 
interpretative issues as the TOJ when it comes to distinguishing changes in neural timing 
from adjustments of criteria. It therefore seems appropriate to make some parallel 
comments about inferences drawn based on the slopes of fitted functions. Intuitively, it 
seems as though the SJ task yields a function that could vary in shape because of either 
differences in sensory noise or the adoption of more or less relaxed criteria. The 
temptation might therefore be to assign preference to the TOJ task when estimating 
variability, as it may appear to be less affected by response criteria. However, our 
modelling makes clear that it is actually quite straightforward to distinguish the extent of 
the criteria from the presence of noise in the SJ task. There is a more fundamental 
problem, however, which is once again the same for both tasks: It is very difficult to 
separate sensory noise from noise in the placement of the criterion/criteria. 
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The modelling we applied has the benefit that it makes explicit where the 
difference in slopes on either side of the simultaneity function might arise (i.e. from 
criterion noise) as well as retaining a perspective on the potential trade-off between 
differential delays and the extent of high and low criteria. Of course, other models may 
well be able to account for our data (e.g. Allik & Pulver, 1994; Burr, Silva, Cicchini, 
Banks & Morrone, 2009; Kristofferson, 1967b; Kristofferson, 1967a; Miller & Schwarz, 
2006; Stelmach & Herdman, 1991). We should also note that the model we describe may 
require elaboration to deal with extant data sets, such as the tendency for high and low 
criteria to be drawn from distributions with negative and positive skews respectively 
(Ulrich, 1987) and the apparent dissociation of order and simultaneity judgements when 
attention is focussed on just one of two visual events (Stelmach & Herdman, 1991). 
 
Our model is fairly straightforward when considered within the conceptual 
framework of signal detection theory, which emphasises the distinction between the 
information available in the internal response, and the criteria used to interpret that 
information. However, a potential limitation of our model is that the precise meaning of 
the key variables (differential delay and criterion extents) is left rather vague when 
considering the SJ task from a neural perspective. Indeed, a more detailed neural-process 
model would be required in order to provide a concrete link between these variables and 
the operation of particular regions of the brain, such as the primary sensory cortices. A 
change in differential delay implies that the transformation between the objective SOA 
and the subjective SOA has changed. However, because we do not know exactly how the 
subjective SOA is represented in the brain (e.g. by the timing of the evoked activity, 
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and/or by changes in the magnitude of a neural response, and/or by a population code in 
which different times activate different units, and/or by some other possibility) we cannot 
ascribe this variable exclusively to an early stage of processing. Similarly, because we do 
not know exactly how a criterion might be applied to a representation of the SOA (e.g. by 
thresholding applied to neural integration at one or several stages, or plastic changes in 
connections between temporal representations and other areas generating a response), we 
cannot claim unequivocally that this variable reflects late neural processing. However, 
despite these limitations the model does seem to represent a reasonable starting point 
from which to examine judgements of temporality.  
 
General Implications 
We have focussed our discussion on the phenomenon of temporal recalibration, 
because we have used that phenomenon to generate a data set that reflects an apparent 
temporal distortion. Hence our specific interpretation regarding shifts in a single criterion 
should not be generalised beyond this phenomenon. However, the interpretative issues 
we have identified are relevant to all studies that have inferred different neural processing 
times on the basis of discrepant PSS estimates obtained in different experimental 
conditions (e.g. Bartels & Zeki, 1998; Stone et al., 2002; Sugita & Suzuki, 2003). In 
short, we believe that such data do not provide unequivocal evidence for a change in 
neural processing times. Instead, it is equally plausible that such data are driven by 
changes in the criteria inherent in subjective timing judgments. Thus, in conclusion, we 
believe that fitting a model like the one used here could inform numerous debates 
concerning the relationship between timing perception and neural processing times. The 
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fundamental message we would like to convey is that SJ tasks, just like TOJs, are not 
well suited for drawing strong conclusions about the mechanisms underlying apparent 
timing distortions. They encompass an ambiguity, reflecting a change in neural 
processing times, a change in one of two criteria used to differentiate synchrony from 
asynchrony, or some combination of these two possibilities. 
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Figure 1 
 
 
Legend to Figure 1 
 
 (A): Illustrative data from a temporal order judgement experiment (auditory only, 
left vs. right) fitted with a cumulative Gaussian curve. (B): Illustrative data from a 
simultaneity judgement experiment (visual-auditory) fitted with a Gaussian curve.  
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Figure 2 
 
 
Legend to Figure 2 
 
 (A): Schematic showing how the mapping between the objective SOA and an 
observer’s subjective SOA (i.e. the differential delay) is combined with the placement of 
a criterion to give rise to a cumulative Gaussian psychometric function in a TOJ task. On 
the right, the function that relates objective and subjective SOAs is depicted. In this case, 
the relationship is veridical (i.e. a differential delay of zero), so subjective SOA will on 
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average equal objective SOA. A differential delay, were it present, would result in a 
function that was displaced along the x axis. The presence of sensory noise is represented 
by the shading variations superimposed on the objective-to-subjective SOA function, 
with darker shading indicating higher probability density. This noise means that on any 
given trial, subjective SOA may not exactly equal objective SOA. The dashed vertical 
line indicates the observer’s criterion (in this case unbiased, so set at zero) for choosing 
one of two responses: For subjective SOAs above the criterion, light is considered to 
precede sound, and vice versa for subjective SOAs below the criterion. Moving to the 
central column of the figure, two probability density functions are shown, each indicating 
how various subjective SOAs will be generated over repeated trials at just one of two 
example objective SOAs (-50 and 50 ms). These can be thought of as slices through the 
objective-to-subjective SOA function (from the right-hand graph). For each objective 
SOA, a proportion of the subjective SOAs will fall above the criterion (shown here as the 
unshaded region) and be judged “light then sound”. These proportions are shown in the 
left-hand column, and yield a predicted psychometric function. (B): The same approach 
used in part A is taken to show how the differential delay, in combination with the 
placement of a two criteria, gives rise to a psychometric function equalling the difference 
of two cumulative Gaussians in an SJ task. Here, the observer classifies the stimuli 
“simultaneous” when the subjective SOA falls between a low criterion and a high 
criterion. Given sensory noise, for each objective SOA, sampled over multiple trials, a 
proportion of trials will be classified simultaneous (shaded area, central column). We can 
predict this proportion by measuring the distance from the left-hand side of the 
probability density function to the high criterion (i.e. a first cumulative Gaussian) and 
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subtracting the distance from the left-hand side of the probability density function to the 
low criterion (a second cumulative Gaussian). This would produce the psychometric 
function shown on the left.
 44
Figure 3 
 
 
Legend to Figure 3 
 
(A): Hypothetical neural activity (impulse responses) in reaction to a brief visual 
event followed after 30 ms by a brief auditory event. The filter applied to the visual 
response has a longer time constant. In this example it seems reasonable that a criterion 
could be placed some way into the visual response such that the auditory response would 
be detected before this point and thus judged simultaneous. (B): Identical internal activity 
with the order of visual and auditory responses reversed (i.e. the visual event follows the 
auditory event by 30 ms). Here it seems unlikely that the visual response would be 
detected prior to reaching a criterion placed anywhere along the auditory response. It 
would therefore be unlikely to be judged simultaneous.  
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Figure 4 
 
 
Legend to Figure 4 
 
(A, B): Schematic showing how the differential delay (represented by the 
intercept of the linear function in part A) and the placement of two criteria (represented 
by dashed vertical lines: LC & HC = low/high criteria respectively) give rise to particular 
psychometric functions under a two-criterion SJ model (see legend to Figure 2 for 
additional explanation). As can be seen from the exact correspondence between objective 
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SOA and the most likely subjective SOA, this observer is veridical (i.e. differential delay 
= 0). They are also unbiased (i.e. equal low and high criterion extents). Part B shows the 
data function predicted by a two-criterion SJ model for the observer described in part A. 
(C-E): Part E shows the same function as part B (from a veridical and unbiased observer, 
in black) alongside a dark grey function that simulates possible responses after some 
experimental manipulation has affected measures of central tendency. The dark grey 
function is shifted entirely to the right. Possible causes for such a shift are schematised 
above in parts C & D. The most parsimonious explanation of such a shift would be that 
the differential delay for this observer has moved towards a positive PSS (shown in part 
C by a leftward shift of the objective-subjective SOA function). An alternative 
explanation would be that the low criterion has tightened up while the high criterion has 
loosened, with no change in the differential delay (shown in D). (F-H): The same format 
is used as in panels C, D & E. Panel H shows veridical and unbiased performance (black) 
alongside new data obtained following some experimental manipulation (light grey 
function). The shape of the light grey function has changed: It has expanded, with a shift 
in central tendency to the right. Possible causes are shown in parts F & G. The most 
parsimonious explanation is that only the high criterion has changed, becoming looser 
(shown in G). An alternative explanation would be that the differential delay has moved a 
small amount towards a positive PSS while the criteria have loosened on both sides 
(shown in F).   
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Figure 5 
 
 
Legend to Figure 5 
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(A): Schematic showing how the placement of two criteria (represented by dashed 
vertical lines: LC & HC = low/high criteria respectively) give rise to particular 
psychometric functions under a two-criterion SJ model. The format is identical to that 
used in Figure 4, which depicted an observer employing tight criteria (i.e. a small 
criterion extent) relative to the magnitude of their sensory noise in order to emphasise 
differences in the shape of the psychometric function when criteria relax. Here, a 
comparable representation is provided for an observer employing much looser criteria 
(i.e. a larger criterion extent) but with identical sensory noise. The shape of these data is 
more typical of audiovisual SJs like those used in the experiment we describe here. (B): 
The black (veridical, unbiased) function represents data from the observer depicted in 
panel A. The two grey functions simulate possible responses after some experimental 
manipulation has affected measures of central tendency. Based on parsimony (for more 
details see the legend to Figure 4) the dark grey function (shifted entirely to the right) 
would be explained most simply by a shift in the differential delay towards a positive 
PSS. The light grey function (which has expanded, with a shift in central tendency to the 
right) would be explained most simply by a loosening of the high criterion. Note that with 
these loose criteria, which are more representative of typical performance than those 
illustrated in Figure 4, the differences between the two situations becomes much less 
striking (c.f. Figure 4 panels E versus H). 
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Figure 6 
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Legend to Figure 6 
 
 Results from analysis one. (A-C): Fits of leftmost and rightmost functions for one 
example participant. Leftmost function =  1 – proportion(sound-then-light∩successive). 
Rightmost function = proportion(light-then-sound∩successive).  (D): Group means 
derived from individual fits for judgement uncertainty (inverse slope) at each adaptor 
asynchrony. Error bars show standard error of the mean.  
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Figure 7 
 
 
Legend to Figure 7 
 
 Results from analysis two. (A-C): Fits of leftmost, rightmost and simultaneity 
functions for the same example participant shown in Figure 6. The size of individual data 
points reflects the number of trials presented at each SOA. Leftmost function data points 
=  1 – proportion(sound-then-light∩successive).  Rightmost function data points = 
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proportion(light-then-sound∩successive). Simultaneity function data points = 
proportion(simultaneous). Leftmost function = low boundary cumulative Gaussian. 
Rightmost function = high boundary cumulative Gaussian. Simultaneity function = High 
boundary cumulative Gaussian – low boundary cumulative Gaussian. (D-G): Group 
means derived from individual fits for low boundary (D), high boundary (E), upper limit 
on sensory noise (F) and difference in criterion variance (G) at each adaptor asynchrony. 
Error bars show standard error of the mean. 
